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The aim of this paper is to investigate the impact of corruption on inflation in the 
EU during the specific conditions of transition of socialist economies to the 
modern entrepreneurial society. We used the corruption perception index as the 
best measure of corruption in observed countries while inflation was measured by 
consumer price index. The research could not be done in terms of administrative 
control on prices because it would not give the right results. Therefore, the 
success of the research assumptions was some level of liberalization of domestic 
economy where the cumulative liberalization index is used as an adequate 
measure. Investigation of seemingly unrelated social phenomena gave additional 
light on the causes of price increases in the observed transition countries, and 
also gave the possibility of finding complete and the most appropriate 
instruments to combat inflation. The researching paper demonstrates the positive 
impact of corruption on inflation while the strength of its influence is however 
weak. In addition too, the impact of corruption on inflation is largely indirect and 
occurs with a time delay because it takes some period of time in order to switch 
"cost of corruption" to the final holders of such costs. Indicators for the observed 
transition time related to Croatia, more closely fit the observed data of other 
transition countries. 
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1. INTRODUCTION   
 The particularity of this work consists precisely in the fact that the 
research applies to countries that were in a specific historical period of transition 
from planned to market economy. Comprehensiveness of the transition involved a 
change of almost the whole structure of national economies of the former socialist 
countries. Initial period of transition for those countries has meant to confront 
with high and variable inflation trends that have sometimes turned into 
hyperinflation. Furthermore, to such an initial figure of transition macroeconomic 
imbalances, underdeveloped financial system and the government still "hungry" 
loans should be added. Transitional conditions have created a unique opportunity 
to explore the relationship of corruption and inflation in totally different 
conditions from those developed in western countries. Given that the transition 
countries that joined the EU during the period of the reforms passed a very 
similar way, we included in our study just such a country with the addition of 
Croatia. 
 Until recently authors did not even looked at the economic consequences 
of corruption. They observed its apparent phenomenon mainly in terms of erosion 
of social morality and the imposition of criminal sanctions. This paper just aims 
to change this view, and a change in perception also helps to a broader reference 
literature in recent years. Such studies require a multidisciplinary character of the 
researchers themselves. Namely, social phenomena which are basically the same 
subject matter of different science still have a lot of touch points that connect 
them.  
 The research required certain prerequisites for its successful 
implementation. Namely, in terms of administrative price controls such research 
would be impossible. Therefore, it was necessary to have a minimum level of 
liberalization for each observed economy to do this researching. Of course, it is 
also necessary to make an adequate choice of methods for measuring corruption 
among the possible options, and explain the reasons behind the use of selected 
methods for measuring. 
 The main hypothesis in this study is that more corruption in transition 
countries causes higher inflation rate. In order to prove the hypotheses we have 
used statistical methods first, and then we pointed out the characteristics of the 
methods which have been obtained from the appropriate conclusions. In addition 
too, the ways of measuring levels of corruption and inflation, their advantages 
and disadvantages, require an adequate explanation of the results. Moreover, the 
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2. THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS AND BRIEF 
 REVIEW OF EMPIRICAL LITERATURE  
So far corruption and its consequences are mainly looked at very trivial way 
through the criminal-law framework with the result in the punishment of immoral 
individuals. However, corruption has many far-reaching effects and could be, or it 
is associated with many other social phenomena. More and more authors are 
involved in researching the economic phenomenon of corruption and its impact 
on many macroeconomic indicators. The focal point of modern researches are on 
the relationship between corruption and other macroeconomic categories like 
level of GDP per capita, economic growth rate, market structure, investment rate 
international trade government revenues, expenditures, shadow economy, the 
quality of public infrastructure, public expenditure allocation, total investment, 
foreign direct investment etc. It is important to stress here the fact that in such 
multidisciplinary researches a large number of economists are included. 
Undoubtedly, only a small number of authors started to research the cause-effect 
relationship between corruption and inflation. In this sense, literature dealing with 
the impact of corruption on inflation becomes more extensive, but it is still 
insufficient. Corruption could be an explanation (certainly not the only 
explanation) for the persistence of high inflation rates in some countries. 
 The adverse effects of rent-seeking on economic growth have been under 
study approximately two decade. Baumol (1990) has presented chronological 
evidence on the negative effect of rent-seeking on economic growth and 
entrepreneurship. He also researched the negative effect of rent-seeking to the 
option of rent-seeking by the gifted people when remuneration structure is in 
opposition to production and entrepreneurship. Murphy, Vishny, and Schlifer 
(1991) brought in their researching paper different levels of increasing income to 
talent in production and rent-seeking. They presented empirical proof based on 
the ratio of students in law and engineering in the USA and argued that rent-
seeking is to be in compliance with economic growth. Barro (1991) and Brumm 
(1999) also found negative relationship between rent-seeking and economic 
growth (and government expenditure). Acemoglu (1995), Mauro (1995) and 
Baumol (2004) concluded that rent-seeking and corruption lead some of the 
economy’s resources to unproductive activities. Cole and Chawdhry (2002) 
concluded that rent-seeking has negative effects on economic growth, public 
investment and public services. They determined rent-seeking using the raw 
numbers of interest organizations registered to lobby in a governing body and the 
interest organization thickness which takes account of the numbers of 
organizations with regard to the volume of a national economy.   
 Knack and Keefer (1995), Knack and Keefer (1997), Sachs and Warner 
(1997), Pellegrini and Gerlagh (2004) came to the conclusion that corruption has 
negative effect on economic growth. Mauro (1995) has focused on the 
relationship between corruption and GDP per capita growth in a large cross-
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section of 68 countries. He found negative effects of corruption and other adverse 
institutional and administrative indices on investment and economic growth. 
Méon and Sekkat (2005) stated that corruption has destructive effect on economic 
growth wherever there is a weak rule of law and the low efficiency of 
government. Méndez and Sepúlveda (2006) indicated that only in the “free” 
countries became visible the adverse impact of corruption on growth. Aidt, Dutta 
and Sena (2008) argued that corruption has an adverse impact on economic 
growth in countries with high quality institutions, and at the same time that 
economic growth reduces corruption, but corruption has no impact on growth in 
countries with low quality institutions.  
 Mauro (1996), Brunetti (1997), Poirson (1998), Ehrilch and Lui (1999), 
Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton (1999), Li, Xu and Zou (2000), Mo (2001), 
Abed and Davoodi (2002), Leite and Weidmann (2002) and Gyimah-Brempong 
(2002), Neeman, Paserman and Simhon (2004) and Welsch (2004) used the level 
of GDP per capita growth as dependent variable and found a significant negative 
impact of corruption on economic growth. Aizenman and Glick (2003) in their 
researching paper calculated approximately that a decline of corruption by one 
index point impact on the rise GDP by 0.5 percentage points. Rock and Bonnett 
(2004) argued that corruption is much more harmful to investment and economic 
growth in small against to great developing countries. They also found that the 
reason for the existence of high levels of corruption and high sustained economic 
growth in the East Asia is East Asian Paradox because corruption networks are 
controlled by a centralized state. Guetat (2006) found significant negative effects 
of corruption undergoing from bad institutions on economic growth for a sample 
of 90 countries in the Middle East and North Africa.  
 Shleifer and Vishny (1993) investigated situation in Russia, Philippines, 
and Africa. Authors concluded that corruption has adverse effects on economic 
growth. They also argued that corruption may be costly because a weak central 
administration tolerates bureaucracies to enforce high levels of bribes on private 
businesses. Corruption has negative impact on GDP per capita in Islam’s (2004) 
researching paper but it is no longer significant when author eliminated the 
unobserved fixed effects and reduced the correlation between exogenous 
variables. 
 Mauro (1996), Brunetti, Kisunko and Weder (1998), Brunetti and Weder 
(1998), Campos, Lien and Pradhan (1999), Mo (2001), Lambsdorff (2003), 
Pellegrini and Gerlagh (2004) argued that more corrupt countries experience 
considerably lower investment rates but negative effects of corruption on 
investment make smaller with higher preventability. Abed and Davoodi (2002) 
concluded that corruption considerably diminishes foreign direct investments. 
According to Wei (1999), Wei (2000), Wei and Smarzynska (2000) corruption is 
active similar to a tax discouraging foreign direct investments. If corruption index 
increases one point it will be the same result as an increasing 7.5 percentage 
points of tax rate. It is very interesting that Pellegrini and Gerlagh (2004) 
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considered that direct impact of corruption on growth doesn’t exist. Corruption 
has direct impact on investment, schooling, trade policies, and political stability 
and like as consequence there is indirect impact on economic growth. Opposite to 
authors before, Barreto (2001) stressed that there is a positive direct impact of 
corruption on economic growth.  
 Tanzi and Davoodi (1997) argued that high corruption is associated with 
high public capital expenditures. Bandeira, Garcia, and da Silva (2001) thought 
that corruption reduces the productivity of capital, the productivity of effective 
human capital, and the total factor productivity. Rose-Ackerman (1975), Rose-
Ackerman (1978), and Becker (1968) look into last two decade relationship 
among corruption on the one sight, and control, market structure and information 
on the other sight. Shleifer and Vishny (1993), Bliss and Di Tella (1997), 
Weinschelbaum (1999), Svensson (1999), Ades and Di Tella (1997), Ades and Di 
Tella (1999) and Laffont and N'Guessan (1999) also studied relationship between 
market structure and corruption.  
 Lambsdorff (1988) evidenced problems for exporters from less corrupt 
countries in business with importers from high corrupt countries. In addition too, 
Hines (1995) statistically argued that aircraft exports from USA have lower 
growth rates in high corrupt countries. Alesina and Weder (2002) concluded that 
corruption hasn’t significant impact on multilateral aid flows. Tanzi and Davoodi 
(2002) argued in their researching paper that corruption reduces quality of roads. 
They also argued that corruption has negative impact on public revenues. Some 
authors found that high corruptive countries have also high level of the unofficial 
economy. According that, Friedman, Johnson, Kaufmann, and Zoido-Lobaton 
(2000) found that corruption has significantly positive effect on shadow 
economy. The same result we could see in researching paper by Johnson, 
Kaufmann and Shleifer (1997) after investigating countries in Latin America, the 
OECD, and ex Soviet Union. 
 Mauro (1998) argued that corruption has negative impact on education 
expenditures. Gupta, De Mello, and Sharan (2001) considered that corrupt 
government has positive impact on military expenses. Some authors like Gupta, 
Davoodi and Tiongson (2002) or Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton (1999) 
showed that corruption has adverse impact on child mortality. Mo (2001) 
evidenced that corruption negatively impact on average years of schooling but 
Pellegrini and Gerlagh (2004) didn’t find that relationship. Some other authors 
like Gupta, Davoodi and Alonso-Terme (2002), Barreto (2001), Gyimah-
Brempong (2002), and Li, Xu and Zou (2000) found high positive relationship 
between corruption and inequality of incomes. Li et al. calculated how much an 
increase in corruption results in an increase of income inequality. 
 It is very important for our researching paper that some authors studied 
relationship between corruption and inflation too. There are not too many such 
researching papers. In this sense there was an interesting work from Al-Marhubi 




(2000) including in his calculation for 41 countries per capita GDP, the degree of 
openness, the turnover of the central bank governor and other indices. He found 
high positive relationship between corruption and inflation. Abed and Davoodi 
(2002) also found positive impact of corruption on inflation in some transition 
countries while Honlonkou (2003) confirmed that corruption has strong impact 
on consumer price change. Bahmani-Oskooee and Nasir (2002) argued that 
corruption has negative impact on extern monetary stability. Of course, the 
depreciation of real exchange rate stimulates export oriented economies. 
 
 
3. APPLIED RESEARCH METHODS AND 
 ASSUMPTIONS  
 It is not easy to measure corruption because it is by its nature hidden, 
and its exterior may look completely legal. Moreover, the undisputed interest of 
corrupt individuals is that their act of corruption is never found out   by a third 
person. Of course, the logical question is how do we measure the corruption and 
whether the established model of measurement will be credible? Certainly, it is 
impossible to have a pharmacy balance for measuring corruption. Each formed 
model has certain advantages and disadvantages. Corruption could be measured 
by different models, but almost all known models are based on measurements of 
corruption by perception of some categories of the population. The best known 
models for the measurement of corruption are bribe payers' index (BPI), global 
corruption barometer (GCB) and corruption perceptions index (CPI). In our study 
we used the corruption perception index (CPI)1 of Transparency International, 
which basically shows the level of perception of corruption among government 
administration and politicians. CPI was formed from data obtained from the 
statements of business people and professionals from the countries assessed. It is 
important to note that CPI investigates corruption in the public sector and it is 
therefore defined as the abuse of public power for personal gain. This 
understanding of corruption may be different than the explanation of corruption 
in the context of the criminal law, evidencing in the individual articles of criminal 
law countries observed. Nevertheless, this understanding of corruption also notes 
the heart of problem and therefore a valid investigation using the advantage of 
such model for measuring corruption and its impact on inflation could be carried 
out.  
 Today it is possible to have results by CPI measures from 180 countries 
and territories around the world based on 13 sources from 10 independent 
institutions. All sources measure frequency and/or size of bribes and provide a 
ranking of countries from 0 to 10 points. The highest level of 10 points means 
that there is no corruption in country and on the other side 0 points means that 
 
1 Johann Lambsdorff from University of Passau developed CPI methodology for Transparency 
International. 
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country is the most corrupted. Evaluation of the extent of corruption in countries 
is done by country experts and business leaders. For instance, in the 2009 country 
reputable experts were African Development Bank - Country Policy and 
Institutional Assessments (AFDB 2008), Asian Development Bank - Country 
Performance Assessment Ratings (ADB 2008), Bertelsmann Foundation - 
Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BF 2009), Economist Intelligence Unit - 
Country Risk Service and Country Forecast (EIU 2009), Freedom House - 
Nations in Transit (FH 2009) Global Insight - formerly World Markets Research 
Centre - Country Risk Ratings (GI 2009) and the World Bank - Country Policy 
and Institutional Assessments for IDA Countries (WB 2008) while resident 
business leaders were Institute for Management Development - World 
Competitiveness Report (IMD 2008 and IMD 2009), Political and Economic Risk 
Consultancy - Hong Kong - Asian Intelligence (PERC 2008 and PERC 2009)., 
and the World Economic Forum - Global Competitiveness Report (WEF 2008 
and WEF 2009).  
 Corruption perception index is measured by the answers obtained from 
business men based on which the corresponding average for each country is 
made. Subsequently, the  result obtained is than calculated for each participant 
and than also the average for certain country.  The problem is non standardised 
scaling system in each of the sources. The differences are standardised in two 
actions. The first technique is “matching percentiles”. This method consists in the 
technique that all the results are denominated in scoring units that are mutually 
comparable. There is a possibility that in such process small amount of 
information could be lost. The next action of the rescaling method is composed of 
applying a beta-transformation for scoring the results obtained. The beta-
transformation increases the standard deviation among all countries included in 
the CPI.  This keeps away from the method by which the corresponding 
percentiles modus operandi effects in a smaller standard deviation from year to 
year. All of the standardised indicators for a country are then averaged in order to 
determine a country's level of corruption. In addition too, number of evidences, 
high-low scope, standard deviation and confidence range for every one country 
are going together with CPI range. Confidence range is established on a 90 per 
cent range with a five per cent probability that the score is under and a five per 
cent probability that the score is higher than this confidence range. 
Inflation in observed countries was measured by consumer price index. The 
method of classification used in consumer price index is based on the 
classification of individual consumption by purpose. This classification divides 
consumer goods and services in twelve groups. Weights are signs of the relative 
significance of the sampled goods or services in the whole consumption of 
inhabitants in some country. The calculation and issuing of consumer price 
indices to public has a consequence in termination of calculation and issuing of 
retail price indices and cost of living indices. This explanation means that 
consumer price index doesn’t include all prices in observed country. The resulting 




parameters are with depreciation in the real value of money (π /1+ π) where π 
means inflation rate. In the posted model, price of goods or services (p) increases 
for a certain amount (Δp) to calculate “cost of corruption” and reaches a higher 
level (p1).    
 In terms of administrative controls on prices this research would not 
produce the right results. Therefore, the assumption of success conducting 
research was certain level of liberalization domestic prices and abolition of state 
monopolies in trade, the domestic currency convertibility and liberalization of 
foreign trade, privatization of enterprises, banking reform, etc. That was the 
reason to use cumulative liberalization index (CLI)2 as the best measure of the 
market liberalization. It must be greater than two which is considered a critical 
size after which the market is sufficiently liberalized. Transition countries mainly 
carry out economic reforms adopted after the stabilization program. However, 
Bulgaria and Romania have delayed adoption of the stabilization program in 
comparison to other transition countries observed, and the level of the CLI in 

















2 Calculation procedure is explained in de Melo et al. (1997). CLI is weighted average of the assessed 
level of liberalization in the internal market, foreign trade and privatized economy, and shows the 
depth of structural and institutional reforms in transition countries. The index is the sum of the 
liberalization of previous years because it is expected that previous reforms have an effect on 
economic performance in the current period 




Stabilization program in transition countries and cumulative liberalization index 
Country Stabilization program 
Cumulative liberalization index 
1992 1993 1994 
Bulgaria July 1997. 1,6 2,26 2,9 
Croatia October 1993. 2,37 3,16 3,98 
Czech R. January 1991. 1,84 2,74 3,64 
Estonia June 1992. 1,23 2,04 2,93 
Hungary Mart 1990. 2,43 3,25 4,11 
Latvia June 1992. 0,97 1,64 2,45 
Lithuania June 1992. 1,05 1,83 2,72 
Poland January 1990. 2,46 3,28 4,14 
Romania February 1997. 1,03 1,61 2,29 
Slovakia January 1991. 1,81 2,64 3,47 
Slovenia February 1992. 2,52 3,34 4,16 
 




4. THE DATA, THE ESTIMATION AND THE RESULTS 
 The research paper covered a total of ten transition countries, EU 
members: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia, including Croatia as a future member of 
EU. The time frame covered by the research was from 1995th to 2008th, but the 
data for some years were not complete (evident from the tables attached to this 
research paper).  Total of 126 cases are evaluated. Data for the 1995th year were 
related only to Hungary, and for 1996th year only for Hungary, Poland and the 
Czech Republic. We have added Romania to data for 1997th year, etc. All eleven 
transition countries have been fully covered by the survey since 1999th. The 
results of multiple regressions are as follows: 
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Table 2  
Multiple Regression Results 
 
Dependent: X2                 Multiple R =  0,22861291                    F = 6,838105 
 
R2=  0,05226386              df =   1,124 
 
No. of cases: 126               adjusted R2=  0,04462083                 p =  0,010030 
 
Standard error of estimate:  0,076170758 
 
Intercept:     0,149570996      Std.Error: 0,0314727     t(124) = 4,7524   
p = 0,0000 
 
X1 beta= - 0,23 
 
 
Source: own calculation 
 
 The average value of corruption in the reference period from 1995th to 
2008th calculated by the CPI method is 4.45 which is still below half the 
maximum level of the CPI score, which means that a country has no corruption. 
Without any doubt, the level of corruption in this period of transition in the EU 
member states (plus Croatia) is not satisfactory. The average deviation from the 
average (standard deviation) for the corruption perception index is 0.985794, and 
the measure of depreciation in the real value of money is 0.080512. The 
coefficient of variation for the corruption perception index of the observed 
countries is 22.1527 %,  which means that the standard deviation is less than one 
third of the mean and the indicators reported can be considered homogeneous. In 
a given time period, more or less, each transition country succeeded  to reduce 
inflation rate to an acceptable level although this level is not always in 
compliance with the terms of the Maastricht Treaty. The coefficient of variability 
of inflation, measured with measure of depreciation in the real value of money, is 
1.128425 which means that a set of these indicators is not homogeneous. The 
correlation coefficient of corruption measured by the corruption perceptions 
index and inflation measured by the consumer price index was negative and 
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amounted to – 0.23 which means that they are readily related phenomena.  
Accordingly, we could argue that reducing the level of corruption in transition 
countries in the given time period has a negative impact on the level of inflation, 
but this impact is rather weak. 
Table 3 
 
Correlation Means  Stand. Deviations N 
1,000000 -0,228613  4,446825 0,985794 126 
-0,228613 1,000000  0,069206 0,077929 126 
 
Source: own calculation 
 
 There are several reasons for such results. First, inflation was measured 
by consumer price index, which means that some categories of prices are not 
included in the index calculation. For example, let us mention that if the effect of 
corruption related to some investment activities, then there would be no direct 
inflationary effect (only an indirect effect) measured by measure of consumer 
price index. As previously stated, this study partially confirms the results of 
research conducted by Al-Marhubi (2000), especially studies that are conducted 
by Abed and Davoodi (2002) in the case of some countries in transition 
 
 




















Graph 1. Corruption and Inflation in Transition Countries 
 
 It is important to stress that a significant part of corrupt activities in 
transition countries is related to various forms of privatization of enterprises that 
were formerly state-owned. Therefore, in such cases a direct connection between 
corruption and inflation was not possible, but the impact of corrupt activities on 
inflation may reflect indirectly. There are numerous cases of privatization of state 
enterprises by capital that originates from off-shore companies, shell companies, 
countries with tax havens etc., which have carried a high cost of financial 
transactions. Finally, such a "cost" is often transferred to the final consumer and 
stimulates prices growth. However, a number of corrupt activities relating to 
public procurement, the granting of concessions, building permits, investment, 
etc., where the corruption actors calculate “cost of corruption” in the final cost of 
such operations, but such prices are not included in the calculation of the 
consumer price index. Therefore, their impact could only be indirect. Another 
characteristic of such impact is that it happens with some time delay because the 
indirect effects need some period of time in order to switch "cost of corruption," 
to the final holders of such costs.  
 With respect to the fact that achieving and maintaining monetary 
stability is entrusted to the central banks in transition countries, while maintaining 
price stability is built into their legislation, and became the bank's primary 
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objective, it is in practice often lead to a unilateral view of the causes of inflation 
and price stability is achieved and maintained almost exclusively by manipulating 
monetary. Transition countries have suppressed high rates of inflation primarily 
by restrictive monetary policy measures. Therefore, an important part of the 
structure stabilization programs were provided by such measures in order to 
achieve price stability. But it doesn’t mean that such measures are sufficiently 
adequate to suppress inflation and maintain an acceptable level. Unfortunately, it 
also meant that stabilization programs have not adequately "identified“ the 
economic consequences of corruption or its effects on particular macroeconomic 
indicators, which resulted that the stabilization programs are not properly 
installed measures for price control. Such a view of combating the cause of 
inflation could lead to its pacifying in the short or medium term, without even 
trying to solve numerous problems that caused its appearance.  Therefore, the 
accumulation of disparities may flare up at some opportune time in the future 
with the painful macroeconomic consequences. 
 In addition to the numerous "classic" factors that affect the level of 
inflation in some countries, recent studies have shown that inflation can be 
affected by other factors such as central bank independence, national culture of 
inflation etc. This indicates the growing need for research into all the 
circumstances of the macroeconomic environment to obtain the results of better 
quality, closer to the real truth, but also practically useful in the effort to complete 
the economic policies of each country. Indicators related to Croatia fit the 
observed data of other transition countries. However, data relating to the level of 
inflation in Croatia are more satisfactory in relation to the indicators relating to 




 Corruption is so far mainly looked at the criminal-law framework with 
intent to punish immoral individuals. But the question is: Does corruption impact 
on other social phenomena? In the centre of our interest we just put a researching 
of prospective impact of corruption on inflation as an important macroeconomic 
indicator of any economy. We considered that the transition of former socialist 
economies provides an exceptional opportunity for understanding the relationship 
between these two social phenomena. Undoubtedly, conducted research has 
shown that there is a positive impact of corruption on inflation in transition 
countries, but the strength of its influence is weak. With respect to fact that 
corrupt activities to a large extent can relate to operations, products and services 
whose prices are not in the structure of consumer price index, the relation of these 
forms of corruption and inflation is indirect and occurs with a time lag.   
 Transition countries have not incorporated measures to combat 
corruption in the stabilization programs. Price stability was achieved primarily by 
monetary measures. Misunderstanding all the factors that influence the price 
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increase may lead to structural imbalances in measures to combat inflation and 
one-sided view that only by monetary manipulation is possible to create and 
maintain price stability as one of the conditions of macroeconomic stability. 
Moreover, the causes of inflation may remain suppressed only with their 
accumulation in a given time period and cause major economic losses in the 
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Graph 2. Distribution of Raw Predicted Values – Expected Normal 


































Graph 8. Inflation and corruption 
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Cilj ovog rada je istražiti utjecaj korupcije na inflaciju u Europskoj Uniji u 
posebnim uvjetima tranzicije u kojoj gospodarstava prelaze iz socijalizma u 
moderno poduzetničko društvo. Za mjerenje korupcije u zemljama uključenim u 
studiju koristili smo indeks percepcije korupcije, a inflaciju smo mjerili indeksom 
potrošačkih cijena. Istraživanje nije moglo biti napravljeno u okviru 
administrativne kontrole cijena jer to ne bi dalo prave rezultate. Stoga uspjeh 
pretpostavki na kojima se temelji ovo istraživanje je na određenoj razini 
liberalizacija domaćeg gospodarstva gdje se kao odgovarajuća mjera koristi 
kumulativni indeks liberalizacije. Istraživanje naizgled nepovezanih društvenih 
fenomena  dodatno objašnjava uzroke povećanja cijena u promatranim zemljama 
u tranziciji, a također i omogućuje pronalazak potpunih i najprikladnijih 
sredstava za borbu protiv inflacije. Rad pokazuje pozitivan utjecaj korupcije na 
inflaciju dok je snaga njenog utjecaja slaba. Osim toga, utjecaj korupcije na 
inflaciju je uglavnom indirektan i javlja se s vremenskim odmakom jer je 
potrebno vrijeme kako bi “trošak korupcije” stigao do krajnjih nositelja tih 
troškova. Pokazatelji za promatrano vrijeme tranzicije u Hrvatskoj pobliže se 
uklapaju u promatrane podatke drugih tranzicijskih zemalja. 
Ključne riječi: korupcija, inflacija, varijabilnost inflacije, isplata.  
JEL klasifikacija: P44 
 
